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1 
In his recent book, The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics, Adrian W. Moore takes Kant to 
play a crucial role in the evolution of modern philosophy.1 Thus, as he notes at the beginning 
of the chapter on Kant (which follows those on Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Hume, and 
precedes those on Fichte, Hegel, Frege, the early Wittgenstein, the later Wittgenstein, Carnap, 
Quine, Lewis, Dummett, Nietzsche, Bergson, Husserl, Heidegger, Collingwood, Derrida and 
Deleuze): 
At this point in the narrative something extraordinary happens. What has gone before 
and what will come after are both largely to be understood in terms of what occurs here. 
Like the central node in a figure ‘X’, this point can be seen as a singularity that draws 
together the various strands above it and issues in those below. (p. 107) 
Although I am unable to do justice to this excellent chapter, I aim to discuss some important 
aspects of Moore’s critique of Kant. In this way, I also hope to question his view on Kant 
more generally. In the next section, I briefly present the main elements of Moore’s reading of 
Kant’s transcendental idealism and attempt some terminological clarification. In section 3, I 
introduce and reply to some of Moore’s preliminary objections to Kant. Even if my replies 
are successful, more serious criticism is presented in section 4, where I attempt to deal with 
three issues. Section 5 concludes this paper by considering the likely motivation that prompts 
Moore’s reading of Kant; my claim is that this reading points to fundamental issues – not of 
Kant’s transcendental idealism, however, but of the traditional idealism his view has often 
been taken to represent. 
2  
According to Moore, Kant’s metaphysics is unsatisfactory (p. 140). In fact, it is not simply 
unsatisfactory, but ‘ultimately and profoundly unsatisfactory’ (ibid.). Moore defines 
metaphysics as ‘the most general attempt to make sense of things’ (p. 1). He concludes his 
discussion of Kant’s metaphysics with the claim that Kant’s most general attempt to make 
sense of things ‘does not itself, in the end, make sense’ (p. 141). In brief, his argument is the 
following: 
It is as if, even by Kant’s own lights, the only real sense that we can make of things is 
whatever sense we can make of them by looking through our spectacles, which means, 
in particular, that we cannot make real sense of the claim that the only real sense we can 
make of things is whatever sense we can make of them by looking through our 
spectacles. (ibid.) 
Moore employs the familiar analogy of Kantian spectacles to elucidate the central question of 
Kant’s critical philosophy, that of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements (p. 117).2 
He also uses it to elucidate the question of the possibility of ‘real’ metaphysics for Kant. For, 
as Kant puts it, for us, metaphysics ‘is not concerned merely with analysing concepts that we 
make of things a priori and thereby clarifying them analytically, but we want to amplify our 
cognition a priori’ (B18). 
Kant of course thinks that the pursuit of real or ‘good’ (p. 123) metaphysics requires his 
famous Copernican revolution in thinking. Thus, with respect to the intuitional component of 
cognition, he says: 
This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make 
good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire 
celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater 
success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. … If intuition has to 
conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything 
of them a priori; but if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the 
constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to 
myself. (Bxvi-xvii) 
Moore reads this as follows: when we have knowledge of something that is independent of us 
(and, he adds, therefore also of something independent of that knowledge), this knowledge is 
possible if we are ‘given’ the thing, if it affects us in some way; in this case, the way in which 
we are affected is sensory. But we can be affected or be given something in a particular way 
only because we have some capacities for reception. Through these capacities, we make a 
contribution to the form and structure of our experience (pp. 119-20). 
This introduces the spectacles analogy: ‘It is as though we have native spectacles through 
which we view things’ (p. 120). Since these spectacles are native, we can know a priori how 
things appear through them. Such knowledge is synthetic, since it is not the result of 
analysing a concept. This knowledge is knowledge of the appearances of things, but derived 
only from our very capacity for such knowledge. So it is not knowledge of how things are in 
themselves, independently of our capacity for such knowledge. This amounts to a version of 
idealism, since ‘the objects of our knowledge, as they are known to us, have a form that 
depends on the knowledge itself’ (p. 120). 
This idealism, Moore continues, ‘is not a matter of what we see through our spectacles’, but 
‘a matter of our seeing through spectacles at all’ (p. 120). For instance, that the sun is larger 
than the moon is part of what we know about objects, but the sun’s being larger than the 
moon does not depend on our knowing it to be so. Yet both the sun and the moon are spatial 
objects and, according to Kant, space is part of our spectacles. In this sense, Kant’s version of 
idealism, transcendental idealism, Moore concludes, refers to the relation of our cognitions to 
the faculty of cognition, not to the relation of our cognitions to things: the word 
‘transcendental’ signifies ‘not our knowledge of objects, but our knowledge of how we know 
them’ (p. 121). 
One may of course wonder how to understand these claims, because, for Kant, what we 
know, the object, is constituted by elements of our knowledge. So there is one sense in which 
the object of our knowledge cannot be independent of that knowledge itself. For instance, 
when we know that the sun is larger than the moon, we know something about spatial objects 
and, according to Kant, these objects are spatial for us, because our cognitive process 
constitutes them as spatial. 
Here is how we are to look at it. Moore claims that, for Kant, the fact that the sun is larger 
than the moon does not depend on our knowing it to be so. Contrast this with Moore’s other 
example: on Kant’s account, things appear through our spectacles as if, for every event in the 
world, there is a cause; this knowledge is derived from our capacity for such knowledge – it 
is not independent of that capacity. The difference is not simply that one type of knowledge is 
of an object that is independent of that knowledge, whereas the other type is of an object that 
is dependent. We also seem to have two distinct criteria of in/dependence at work: above we 
said that, for Kant, our knowledge that the sun is larger than the moon does not depend on our 
knowing it to be so; here, the claim is that our knowledge that any event in the world has a 
cause does depend on our capacity for knowing it.  
The first criterion of in/dependence is relative to our knowing X, whereas the second criterion 
is relative to our capacity for knowing X. The kind of knowledge that we have when we say 
that any event in the world has a cause is knowledge of something that does depend on our 
capacity for knowledge, because (at least if Kant is right) this is knowledge of something that 
derives from our epistemic capacity. By contrast, our knowledge that the sun is larger than 
the moon does not derive merely from our capacity for knowledge – we need experience to 
know that the sun is larger than the moon.  
As noted, Moore takes Kant’s ‘idealism’ to refer to some sort of relation of dependence 
between the objects of our knowledge and our knowledge. I will return to a discussion of this 
relation in the final section of the paper. In the next section, I will begin to present and 
discuss some preliminary objections to Kant that Moore formulates. 
3 
Moore focuses next on Kant’s distinction between appearances or phenomena and things in 
themselves. Phenomena are the objects of our experience as perceived through the spectacles, 
whereas things in themselves are the objects of our experience independently from our 
spectacles and, hence, as they are in themselves. One of the central questions Moore raises is 
whether, on Kant’s account, we can know anything about things in themselves. First, he 
answers, Kant does not deny that we can have analytic knowledge about things in 
themselves:  
Hence he does not pick any quarrel with metaphysicians when they apply the laws of 
logic in their abortive attempts to engage in transcendent metaphysics, whatever other 
quarrels he might pick, and he himself makes free use of such laws, in application to 
the transcendent, when rebutting them. (133)  
Here Moore makes reference to A258-9/B314-5 to substantiate the claim that Kant does not 
deny that we have analytic knowledge about things in themselves. I find this puzzling, since 
at A258/B313-4 Kant seems to deny precisely the possibility of knowledge about things in 
themselves, whether analytic or not. For instance, for Kant,  
[i]f, therefore, we say: The senses represent objects to us as they appear, but the 
understanding, as they are, then the latter is not to be taken in a transcendental but in a 
merely empirical way, signifying, namely, how they must be represented as objects of 
experience, in the thoroughgoing connection of appearances, and not how they might be 
outside of the relation to possible experience and consequently to sense in general, thus 
as objects of pure understanding. For this will always remain unknown to us, so that it 
even remains unknown whether such a transcendental (extraordinary) cognition is 
possible at all, at least as one that stands under our customary categories. (A258/B313-
4)  
Kant denies here the possibility of cognition of objects otherwise than as objects of possible 
experience. Moreover, he also denies cognition based on analysis only: ‘With us 
understanding and sensibility can determine an object only in combination.’ (A258/B314) 
The chapter ‘On the ground of the distinction of all objects in general into phenomena  and 
noumena’, where the quotations above are located, denies precisely the possibility of making 
use of a concept to refer to things in themselves –transcendentally, as Kant puts it.3 It is 
unclear how we can have analytic knowledge about things in themselves, if the concept to be 
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analysed as part of the analytic judgement cannot refer to things in themselves. These are 
only some worries, but I do not focus much on them, since, as we will see below, there are 
more challenging objections to consider.4 
Moore is certainly right that Kant makes use of logic to rebut transcendent metaphysicians. I 
think there are at least two such legitimate uses. One is by pointing to inconsistencies in the 
reasoning of these metaphysicians. A second is by pointing to claims that go beyond the 
particular universe of discourse specific for particular contexts – and this is more directly 
relevant for the arguments of transcendent metaphysicians. For instance, Kant distinguishes 
between a dialectical opposition (the world as infinite versus the world as finite or non-
infinite) and an analytical opposition (the world as infinite and the world as not infinite), and 
argues that the former adds a determination to the world considered as a thing in itself 
(namely, its magnitude). 
Now, according to Moore, it is not only analytic knowledge about things in themselves that 
Kant does not deny; he does not even deny synthetic knowledge about things in themselves. 
Moore offers the following examples: Kant says that it is absurd to claim that there is an 
appearance without anything that appears (Bxxvi-xxvii, A696/B724, Prolegomena 4: 350-1), 
and he makes several claims about what things in themselves are not. 
These claims which seemingly contradict what Kant says about the limits of our cognition 
have of course already been the object of debate in the literature.5 Kant has been defended as 
making legitimate use of negative claims concerning things in themselves and as justifying 
the claim about the necessity of things in themselves as corresponding to appearances only as 
a problematic necessity, and the things only as possible objects of thinking.6 Perhaps for this 
reason, Moore regards these as only potentially problematic: ‘…is it simply that we are 
beginning to witness cracks in Kant’s edifice?’ (p. 134). I am therefore not going to say 
anything else about these issues, but will move on to the more serious worry Moore expresses 
in this chapter. 
4 
Recall Moore’s claim that the only real sense we can make of things is whatever sense we 
can make of them by looking through our spectacles – call this the Real Metaphysics Claim 
(henceforth RMC); recall also his claim that we cannot make real sense of the RMC. This 
means that Moore assumes the RMC is not or cannot be the result of our looking through our 
spectacles. And yet Kant is quite clear that we can only look at things through our spectacles. 
If the RMC is such that we cannot make real sense of it, this must be because of the kind of 
claim it is. What kind of claim is it? We can see this more clearly by looking at another 
formulation of the same problem. The question is, again, whether Kant’s position concerning 
the limits of our knowledge is consistent with some of the claims he makes, which, Moore 
argues, suggest that we can have knowledge about things in themselves. And yet unlike the 
previous examples of claims Kant makes about things in themselves, in this case, the 
contradiction seems to be systematic and affecting Kant’s system as a whole. For, this time, it 
is the very claim that we can only have metaphysical knowledge in the form of synthetic a 
priori judgements that Moore suggests goes against Kant’s view that we cannot have 
synthetic knowledge of things in themselves: 
Can Kant himself be seen as pursuing synthetic a priori knowledge about how things 
(must) appear, but not about how they are in themselves? … [C]onsider the very 
judgement that our metaphysical knowledge, like our mathematical knowledge, is 
synthetic and a priori. This must itself, presumably, count as an item of synthetic a 
priori knowledge. And yet, precisely in registering the non-analytic character of the 
knowledge in question, does it not also have some claim to being, at least to that extent, 
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the very thing that an item of synthetic a priori knowledge supposedly cannot be, 
namely a judgement about things in themselves? (p. 138) 
On Moore’s account, from our (human) standpoint, the a priori conditions of our experience 
cannot be other than they are. They are part as it were of our spectacles. But if they are 
instruments which make it possible for us to have substantial knowledge, then this knowledge 
is not to be expected from the instruments (spectacles), but from what we get to learn with 
their help (what we see through the spectacles). Hence, from the human standpoint, these a 
priori conditions cannot make a substantial contribution to our knowledge.7 Nevertheless, 
Kant does claim that these a priori conditions do make a substantial contribution to our 
knowledge, because he sees the knowledge as synthetic. If from our human standpoint they 
cannot make a substantial contribution to our knowledge and, yet, Kant claims they do, then 
he commits himself to a perspective beyond the human standpoint. It is from this new 
perspective that our synthetic a priori knowledge would be seen as substantial (p. 139). 
Moore thinks the following claim by Kant confirms this: 
The proposition “All things are next to one another in space” is valid only under the 
limitation that these things be taken as objects of our sensible intuition. If here I add the 
condition to the concept and say: “All things, as outer intuitions, are next to one another 
in space”, then this rule is valid universally and without limitation. (A27/B43) 
Kant may be thought to confirm here that we have access to a perspective which goes beyond 
the limitation of sensible intuition. From this perspective, some claims have, for us, universal 
and unconditional validity. Yet, the ‘us’ here is no longer the group of human beings with the 
epistemic spectacles provided by a priori intuitions and concepts, since such human beings, 
on Kant’s own account, have only access to objects of sensible intuition.  
Again, there would be a lot to discuss here, but I mention only three concerns. First, does 
Kant’s acknowledgement that synthetic a priori judgements are constitutive of our 
experience mean that they cannot make substantial contributions to our cognition? For Kant, 
one criterion for deciding whether something makes a substantial contribution to our 
knowledge is the principle of non-contradiction; if denying a judgement leads to a 
contradiction,  then the judgement is analytic and, hence, not substantial. But Kant’s claim is 
that the necessity associated with these non-substantial judgements is distinct from the 
necessity of synthetic a priori judgements. Why suppose that the latter must also be non-
substantial?  
To put this differently: one might perhaps suggest, following Moore, that, as constitutive of 
experience, a synthetic a priori judgement is already presupposed by experience and, hence, 
is not informative or substantial. But this is simply not Kant’s view of substantial judgements 
– Kant does not assume that the only substantial judgements are those which are not 
necessary for experience; on the contrary, experience is made possible by principles which 
are synthetic and a priori true. If substantial judgements were only those which were 
contingent for our experience, then the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements would be 
denied from the start. It would follow, then, unsurprisingly, that we can talk about synthetic 
judgements that claim to be a priori only in relation to things in themselves.8 Kant would 
seem committed to knowledge of things in themselves in his pursuit of synthetic a priori 
knowledge. But this self-stultification can easily be avoided, since we have a good Kantian 
alternative: necessary judgements which are a priori in virtue of their reference to our a 
priori intuitions. 
Secondly, consider Kant’s comment that all outer appearances are next to one another in 
space; according to Moore, Kant here abandons the human standpoint and regards certain 
judgements from the perspective of things in themselves. He contrasts there two kinds of 
validity (A27/B43):  
- That of the proposition P1: ‘All things are next to one another in space’, which is 
conditionally valid under the limitation that these things be taken as objects of our 
sensible intuition. 
- And that of the proposition P2: ‘All things, as outer appearances or intuitions, are next 
to one another in space’, which is valid universally and without the limitation above. 
Consistently with Kant’s claim that we cannot have knowledge of things in themselves, can 
we not take him to be saying simply that, by indexing the statement concerning outer 
appearances being next to one another in space, the statement becomes universal precisely by 
reference to all appearances and not, self-stultifyingly, with reference to things in 
themselves? 
Let me explain this further. Let us assume, as Moore suggests, that the domain of discourse 
for the first sentence is that of outer appearances, whereas the domain of discourse for the 
second is that of all things, including things in themselves. If this were so, then Kant would – 
perhaps unwittingly – commit himself to a knowledge claim concerning things in themselves, 
since he would assume a position which transcends the human standpoint. But one obvious 
question to ask is whether Kant would miss anything important by instead limiting the 
universe of discourse, as suggested above, to the domain of objects of possible experience? If 
not, then a charitable interpretation would surely allow this to him. 
From his discussion of the two statements, as well as, more generally, from his expositions of 
space, Kant seems to derive the following conclusion: 
Our expositions accordingly teach the reality  (i.e., objective validity) of space in 
regard to everything that can come before us externally as an object, but at the same 
time the ideality of space in regard to things when they are considered in themselves 
through reason, i.e., without taking account of the constitution of our sensibility. 
(A28/B44) 
Does the conclusion that space is transcendentally ideal presuppose a claim to knowledge of 
things in themselves? I think that Kant answers this negatively: as the way in which we 
receive impressions from outer objects, space is a form of one of our epistemic capacities, 
namely, a form of sensibility; if we consider an object without taking into account the 
specific way in which it is given to us, then, as it is in itself and independently from us, the 
object is not spatial; spatiality depends on our epistemic capacities and, hence, according to 
the definition of transcendental idealism presented in section 2, it is transcendentally ideal. 
However, this conclusion is derived only by considering things in themselves in the negative 
sense that Kant specified as legitimate (again, as discussed at the end of section 3): namely, 
we attribute to things in themselves only properties included in the presupposition that the 
object has as a property nothing belonging to sensible intuition. If this is correct, then we 
could read Kant as consistent: his view that the second statement is universally and 
unconditionally true does not require a perspective which transcends the human standpoint. 
In fact it might even be that this ‘charitable’ interpretation is philosophically required in this 
context. Let us assume that the universe of discourse for P2 is indeed all things – including 
things in themselves. On one standard reading, what a statement does is to attribute certain 
properties to the entities which constitute the domain of discourse. It does this by using 
certain predicates. But there is a complication as to how we should understand this universe 
of discourse. 
 As is well known, there are at least two important interpretations of transcendental idealism, 
which yield distinct views of our universe of discourse.9 According to the two-world 
interpretation, things in themselves and objects of experience are numerically different 
entities. As a result, our universe of discourse will consist of things in themselves (t1, t2, …, 
tn) and distinct objects of experience (o1, o2, …, on). By contrast, the two-standpoint 
interpretation claims that things in themselves and objects of experience are not numerically 
distinct, but every object of experience (on), as conceived independently of our epistemic 
capacities, is a thing in itself (tn). In this case, any relevant things in themselves would simply 
be objects of experience conceived independently from the human standpoint. So we should 
either regard this universe of discourse as populated by things in themselves or by objects of 
experience. 
Now Moore adopts the two-standpoint account, although not without qualifications (p. 121 
note 36) Moreover, he claims that the second statement includes a commitment to a universe 
of discourse consisting of things in themselves. Yet this leads to an important difficulty, 
since, on Kant’s account, we cannot ascribe spatial predicates to things in themselves. Hence, 
P2 (‘All things, as outer appearances, are next to one another in space’) would not make 
sense, if by ‘things’ we meant things in themselves. Outer appearances are not things in 
themselves that have additional spatial properties; things in themselves are things considered 
independently from our epistemic capacities; as soon as we introduce spatial properties, we 
adopt the human standpoint and abandon the transcending standpoint of things in themselves. 
Hence, P2 simply says that ‘Objects of human experience (which may be inner or outer), as 
outer appearances, are next to one another in space’.  
Unless we adopt the two-world interpretation, which Moore (rightly, I think) avoids, outer 
appearances are a subset of possible objects of experience, but are not a subset of things in 
themselves. Thus the unconditional and universal character of the truth of P2 confirms that 
the domain of discourse is given by objects of human experience. For, as Kant says, ‘the 
source of all truth’ is the source ‘of the agreement of our cognition with objects’. 
(A237/B296) Yet, within the confines of theory (as opposed to practical philosophy), the only 
way for us to make sense of the notion of an agreement with objects is within the domain of 
possible experience. Hence, the passage quoted by Moore is not a confirmation of the self-
stultification of Kant’s position. 
A third concern is as follows. Moore claims that a problem for Kant’s position is that it 
cannot make real sense of itself. Given that, for Moore, metaphysics is the most general 
attempt to make sense of things, an important part of metaphysics has a self-reflective 
character: it attempts ‘to reflect on one’s own activity, and to try to make sense, in particular, 
of the sense that one makes of things’ (p. 7) But, just for this reason, the self-reflective 
account which is obtained in this way has a more general character than the account which 
explains how to make sense of things, and it is a meta-metaphysical enterprise.  
Kant’s attempt to make sense of things is his transcendental idealism. If his meta-metaphysics 
cannot make real sense of transcendental idealism, then whatever philosophical advantages 
transcendental idealism may have in its disputes with alternative metaphysical theories will 
be seriously undermined. As we have seen, one form this issue can take is the suggestion that 
we cannot make real sense of the Real Metaphysics Claim. A more explicit form was also 
articulated in the charge introduced above: our metaphysical knowledge is synthetic and a 
priori; this claim must itself, presumably, count as an item of synthetic a priori knowledge; 
and yet this seems to be a judgement about things in themselves; if so, then we cannot really 
account for it.10 
But I wonder whether we need to accept that the claim that our metaphysical knowledge is 
synthetic and a priori is itself a synthetic a priori judgement.11 After all, with this additional 
degree of reflection, we seem to be well anchored above intuition within the realm of 
concepts, and so one would think within the realm of the analytic. Given that Kant seems to 
define metaphysical knowledge as knowledge which is both necessary and substantial, it 
follows that the claim under question cannot be synthetic.12 Even in this case, one important 
issue may remain, so I add here a final clarificatory comment. Consider Moore’s worry: Kant 
can account for the synthetic a priori item of knowledge that metaphysical knowledge is 
synthetic a priori only by making substantial knowledge claims about things in themselves. 
So far, I have put a lot of emphasis, in my evaluation of his criticism, on the following 
argument Moore seems to provide against Kant. From our human standpoint, the a priori 
conditions of our experience cannot be otherwise than they are – they are, as it were, part of 
our spectacles; therefore they cannot be expected to provide us with substantial, non-analytic 
knowledge. Yet Kant thinks that these a priori conditions are a basis for synthetic a priori 
knowledge; so if such knowledge is not possible from the human standpoint, then Kant must 
be committed to its possibility from a perspective beyond that of the human, and so with 
regard to things in themselves. 
I have explained what I think is wrong with this argument. But I would like to make an 
observation: insofar as this is the argument on which Moore relies in order to show that the 
synthetic a priori claim ‘Metaphysical knowledge is synthetic a priori’ requires substantial 
knowledge of things in themselves, this is an argument which applies to any synthetic a 
priori claim whatsoever – whether it is a second-order claim about our metaphysical 
knowledge or a first-order claim about objects of our knowledge. One concern that remains is 
that, in this way, I do not capture the significance that Moore attributes to the fact that Kant’s 
problem has to do specifically with the second-order claim that we have metaphysical 
knowledge. Hence, the remaining worry is the following: when I reflect on the truth of my 
claim that metaphysical knowledge is synthetic a priori, because I do not make reference to 
objects of my knowledge, but talk about knowledge in general, I seem to need a perspective 
which is beyond the a priori conditions that make objects of knowledge possible for me, that 
is, beyond the human standpoint. 
Consider again the example: according to Moore, P1 is true for outer appearances, whereas 
P2 is true universally. As we have seen, however, for Kant, certain claims we can make about 
appearances do not make sense when applied to things in themselves. For instance, whereas it 
makes sense to say that all appearances, as outer appearances, are next to one another in 
space, it makes no sense to say that all things (including things in themselves), as outer 
appearance, are next to one another in space. 
In the Amphiboly, Kant states explicitly that ‘the representation of an object as a thing in 
general is not merely insufficient but rather, without sensible determinations of it and 
independent of an empirical condition, contradictory in itself’ (A279/B335). Kant draws a 
distinction between a logical and a transcendental consideration of a judgement. The first 
looks at the judgement’s concepts independently of the objects they refer to and, hence, 
independently of the cognitive faculty for which they can be an object; the second, by 
contrast, looks at the concepts as referring to particular objects, which can either be merely 
objects of pure understanding or objects of sensibility. Hence,  
one must either abstract from any object (in logic), or else, if one assumes an 
object, then one must think it under conditions of sensible intuition; … the 
intelligible would require an entirely special intuition, which we do not have, and 
in the absence of this would be nothing for us; … appearances also cannot be 
objects in themselves. (ibid.) 
Thus with regard to the second-order judgement that Moore takes to be problematic, a logical 
consideration would only regard it as a relation between concepts without concern for what 
these concepts refer to – whether appearances or things in themselves. From this perspective, 
we could perhaps say that it is analytic or synthetic. If, by contrast, we consider it 
transcendentally then we would need to think it under conditions of sensible intuition. If, by 
contrast, we were to regard this judgement as referring to things in themselves, then not only 
could we not have synthetic knowledge of these things in themselves, but assuming we had, 
we would not be able to regard this as a condition for the truth of this judgement as applied to 
appearances, as Moore suggests would be entailed by asserting the synthetic a priori truth of 
the judgement that metaphysical knowledge is synthetic a priori. For, according to Kant, 
‘even if we could say anything synthetically about things in themselves through pure 
understanding (which is nevertheless impossible), this still could not be related to 
appearances at all, which do not represent things in themselves’ (A276/B332). 
With this, I conclude the discussion of Moore’s objection of self-stultification. In the next and 
final section, I suggest one possible motivation for Moore’s objection. 
5 
In Section 2 we saw that, according to Moore, Kant’s idealism refers to a relation of 
dependence between the objects of our knowledge and our knowledge of these objects. 
However, Kant’s transcendental idealism must be carefully distinguished from traditional 
idealism, a view from which Kant tried to distance himself, but with which he has been 
associated by critics ever since he published the first Critique. Transcendental idealism 
claims that the objects of our knowledge do not depend on what we know and so on ‘our 
knowledge’ of them, but on how we know them. In other words, the objects depend on the 
forms of our sensibility and on the categories of our understanding – they are constituted by a 
priori intuitions and concepts – but they are not reducible to them. Thus as we have seen, 
synthetic a priori judgements refer to facts which depend on our epistemic capacities, while 
empirical judgements are judgements about objects independent from our knowledge. By 
contrast, it is traditional idealism (usually associated with Berkeley) that takes our objects of 
knowledge to depend on our knowledge of them and, hence, to be reducible to them.  
Contrast these forms of idealism with transcendental realism, according to which we can have 
synthetic knowledge of things in themselves. According to this position, the objects of our 
knowledge (things in themselves) are independent from our knowledge of them, since by 
definition things in themselves are things as they are independently of our epistemic 
capacities. Moore’s criticism of Kant thus relies on the claim that we must claim synthetic 
knowledge of things in themselves, and so be transcendental realists, if we are to be able to 
account for a central claim of transcendental idealism, namely that metaphysical knowledge 
is synthetic a priori.13  
Thus Moore’s subtle reading of Kant is cast in the form of an objection to Kant’s 
inconsistency, philosophically the strongest type of objection one can formulate. Yet, if my 
replies are correct, then perhaps Moore’s objections do not really point to the inconsistency 
of transcendental idealism, but to some strong reasons why traditional idealism is 
unacceptable. As we have seen, Moore’s argument is that, on Kant’s account, we should and 
can have access to things in themselves, since it is only by reference to this access that we 
can make sense of our alleged metaphysical knowledge of phenomena. This suggests that 
Moore regards Kant’s transcendental idealism as potentially collapsing into a traditional 
version of idealism.  
To be sure, as Moore also notes (p. 141), this is an interpretation of Kant that has a long 
history and very powerful representatives.14 If it turns out this reading of Kant is correct, then 
Moore’s argument concerning the possibility and need for synthetic knowledge of things in 
themselves may be supported indirectly, as a critical reaction to traditional idealism and an 
attempt to rescue transcendental idealism from collapsing into it. 
Yet, although Moore’s criticism may be well motivated in this way, I have argued that it is 
eventually unwarranted. The starting point of Moore’s discussion is the question of the 
cogency of Kant’s metaphysics; in response I have argued that two of his arguments in 
support of the claim that, on Kant’s account, we can only account for our metaphysical 
knowledge as synthetic a priori from a perspective which transcends the human perspective 
are not warranted. If this is right, then the arguments are not sufficient to show that Kant’s 
transcendental idealism is, as Moore claims, unsatisfactory.15 
Endnotes
 
1 In what follows, references in the text unaccompanied by publication year will be to Moore 
2012. References to Kant’s first Critique follow the A (first edition), B (second edition) 
convention. Kant 1998 will be used throughout this exchange, but I compare it with Kant 
1996, which I normally use.   
2 The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements has been discussed, 
reconstructed and contested in various ways. For a recent defence, see Hanna 2012. 
3 For instance, at A238-9/B297-8. 
4 In correspondence, Moore kindly answered to my puzzlement above about A258-9/B314-5: 
he said his reference was in fact to the paragraph after the one I quoted; while he does not 
think there is a tension between the two paragraphs, but rather that the distinction between 
‘knowledge’ and ‘cognition’ may be relevant here, he also acknowledges there is much more 
to be said about this. A lot can be discussed on both of these points. There are two reasons 
why I think that, while the distinction between knowledge and cognition in Kant is important 
 
in its own right, it is not directly relevant in this context. As Moore notes, before the 1998 
Cambridge edition of the first Critique, some translators used ‘knowledge’ to translate both 
Kant’s Erkenntnis and Wissen. He thinks, and I agree, that ‘cognition’ should be used for 
Erkenntnis, whereas ‘knowledge’ is more appropriate for Wissen (p. 112 note 13); my 
concern starts from Werner Pluhar’s observation in his 1996 translation of the first Critique 
that certain cases of practical cognition (Erkenntnis) (for instance, that of God) are not 
instances of knowledge (Wissen) (note 6 at Avii). This is quite clear from Kant’s discussion 
in the section ‘On having an opinion, knowing and believing’ (A820-31/B848-59). The 
discussion of the distinction between knowledge and cognition is only indirectly relevant in 
this context, because, if we are to have something about things in themselves, this should be 
cognition, rather than knowledge. The second reason has to do with the way Kant 
understands knowledge in the first Critique. He takes knowledge to be assent 
(Fürwahrhalten) that is sufficient both subjectively and objectively. A lot can be said about 
all these terms, but I draw attention to the fact that, for Kant, assent which is sufficient 
objectively has its basis in an object (A820-1/B848-9). Yet ‘what the concept might pertain to 
is indifferent’ in the case of analytic knowledge (A259/B314). Of course, ‘it is enough for 
him [who uses understanding analytically] to know [wissen] what lies in its concept…’ 
(A259/B314). So we may of course call this analytic knowledge by taking its object to be the 
concept whose marks I am trying to identify through analysis. But, then, this would be 
analytic knowledge about concepts, rather than things in themselves. Whether the concepts 
are taken to refer to appearances or things in themselves would be a distinct question. And it 
would be this distinct question that would be relevant for the discussion of whether Kant 
oversteps the limits he himself has placed on our knowledge of things in themselves. In this 
paper, I use ‘knowledge’ and ‘cognition’ interchangeably, because there are cases where the 
notions overlap and I think the debate here is concerned with such cases. 
 
5 See, for instance, Bird (2006: ch. 9). 
6 Things in themselves are a type of object for which sensible intuitions are not possible; so 
all we can do is ‘present it through all the predicates that are already contained in the 
presupposition that the object has as a property nothing belonging to sensible intuition’ 
(B149). See also my discussion (2011: esp. section 6). 
7 Immediately following this (p. 139), Moore says something that might seem initially 
puzzling:  ‘That is to say, they [these conditions] cannot make the kind of contribution that 
they would not have made if they had been suitably other than they are, the kind that prevents 
the knowledge in question from answering merely to the concepts involved in it.’ See the 
next note for further comment. 
8 And this is indeed what Moore suggests; see the preceding note. In other words: in order for 
these conditions to make a substantial contribution, it should be possible for them to be other 
than they are from the human standpoint, and this would depend on some contingency about 
how they are. This contingency can only obtain from outside the human standpoint and, 
hence, will go against Kant's claim that we cannot say anything (other than in negative terms) 
from that standpoint. (I am grateful to Adrian Moore for confirming the accuracy of this 
interpretation of his view.) 
9 Moore notes three such interpretations, adding to the two I will mention below Bird’s 
interpretation (2006: chs 1 and 30). I think Bird’s interpretation will yield a view of the 
universe of discourse considered here similar to the view offered by the two-standpoint 
account.  
10 A third formulation of this issue is presented by Moore in terms of what he calls the ‘Limit 
Argument’ (p. 135). My main problem with this is that it is too ‘intuitive’ (that is, space-
related) – it may bewitch us into accepting the view that, in order to know that metaphysical 
knowledge is synthetic a priori,  Kant needs to make some knowledge claims concerning 
 
things in themselves. What may bewitch us, in particular, is the suggestion of a spatial 
element, not really appropriate in the case of the idea of a limit that ‘separates’ phenomena 
from things in themselves. 
11 If the point is not that the claim ‘Our metaphysical knowledge is synthetic a priori’ is 
synthetic, but that in order to be in a position to know that any particular proposition is true a 
priori, one must be assessing the proposition with respect to things in themselves, then my 
reasons for finding this unconvincing have been formulated at the beginning of this section. 
12 I am thinking of the discussion of metaphysics in the Introduction to the First Critique. 
13 Moreover, Moore acknowledges this commitment to transcendental realism (1999: 387). 
14 For a discussion of this accusation in relation to some of the representatives of British 
Idealism, see Baiasu 2013 a and b. 
15 Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Adrian Moore for email correspondence on several 
issues I raised while writing this paper. I am also grateful to Sebastian Gardner for sharing his 
paper (forthcoming) on the text by A. W. Moore that I discuss here. I would like to thank 
Pamela Sue Anderson for chairing the session of the event of the Keele-Oxford-St Andrews 
Research Centre for Kantian Studies (KOSAK), where these papers were presented, for 
discussion and for suggesting the project of this exchange. Work on this paper was carried 
out while I was visiting at the University of Vienna, as part of the project ‘Distortions of 
Normativity’; I am grateful to the project’s PI and to Keele University for making this 
possible. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers from the journal for comments on earlier 
drafts of this paper. Finally, I would like to thank Richard Aquila for comments on earlier 
drafts of this paper and for hosting this critical exchange. 
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